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A CONTRACTUAL APPROACH
TO DATA PRIVACY
STEVEN A. BIBAS*

We live i n an information society. The computerized networks
of data encircling our lives bring us myriad benefi ts. The free
flow of credit data lets a creditor trust a borrower even if they are
strangers . Nationwide computer bulletins help police capture fu
gitive felons. Financial market information permits i nvestors to
price gocds accurately, balancing supply and demand. Commu
nication between banks allows Californians to use their auto
mated-teller-machine (ATM) cards in Boston or Berlin.
But every silver lining has a cloud. Although the ready availa
bility of information helps us to trust others and coordinate ac
tions, i t also lessens our privacy. George Orwell presciently
expressed our fear of losing all privacy to an omniscient Big
Brother.1 Computers today track our telephone calls, credit-card
spending, plane flights, educational and employment records,
medical histories, and more . Someone with free access to this
information could piece together a coherent picture of our
actions.
Big Brother is not watching-yet. The p rospect, however, of
easy access to personal data makes many Americans squirm .2 The
status quo poorly protects data privacy. The predictable Ameri
can response has been to cry [ t] here oughta be a law"3 and pro
pose the creation of a federal government agency.4 Most
"
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1. GEORGE 0RvVELL, 1984 (Signet Classics 1983) (1949).

2. See infra Part I.A.
3. Todd Purdum, He Didn't Slash Budgets, N.Y. Tr:-..rEs, Apr. 26, 1992, § 4, at 6 (referring
generally, and not in the context of data privacy, to American reliance on this "venerable
democratic maxim").

.

4. See DAVID BuRNHAM, THE RlsF. OF THE CoMPUTER STAT E 243 ( 198 0 ) (opposing such
proposals and calling them a cure "more deadly than the disease").

592

Harvard journal of Law & Public Policy

proposed solutions
regulation.5

focus

on

centralized

[Vol. 17

legislation

and

Portraying the choice as centrally planned government action
versus doing nothing creates a false dichotomy. A contractual so
lution could give individuals the power to choose privacy or not
without requiring privacy for everybody or nobody. This Article
argues that a contractual solution would be superior to ap
proaches dictated by legislators, bureaucrats, or judges because it
would be more sensitive to individual preferences.
This Article looks only at private-sector data banks such as
credit bureaus; data gathering by government agencies raises dif
ferent issues.6 Furthermore, this Article focuses on proposals lim
iting the dissemination of accurate data.7 Finally, rather than
speculating about the possible sale of intimate secrets,8 this Arti
cle discusses types of information that businesses commonly han
dle, such as addresses and credit histories.
Part I of this Article outlines concerns about privacy and finds
that Americans share no consensus on the importance of the
problem. Moreover, an information economy produces large
countervailing benefits. Any solution should be sensitive to indi
vidual valuations of the tradeoffs involved instead of giving pri
vacy to everybody or nobody. Part II discusses proposed solutions
involving legislation, administrative regulation, state constitu
tional rights, and tort law. Part III criticizes these proposals be
cause they inefficiently ignore individual preferences and
valuations. Under such regimes, some people would get less pri
vacy than they wanted and others would get more than they
wanted. Part IV sketches the legal bases for a contractual apSee infra Part II.A.
6. Because the government often compels disclosure by threatening to impose civil or

5.

criminal sanctions, the data giver's consent is

a

problematic, if not illusory, notion. The

private sector, furthermore, provides data givers greater bargaining power because private
businesses, unlike government organizations, usually lack monopoly power.

7. Much of the literature on data privacy confuses two analytically distinct issues by

discussing privacy concerns along with concerns about false information.

See, e.g., Ken·
Acce.ISibility of Stored Personal
Data, 31 L-\.W & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 342 (1966); Arthur R. Miller, Pers ona l Privacy in the
Computer Age: The Chal ienge of a New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L.
REv. 1089, 1114-19 ( 1969); Lauretta E. Murdock, Comment, The Use and Abuse of C om,tmter
neth L. K.1
' rst, "The Files": Legal Controls ova the Accuracy and

ized Infonnalion: StTiking a Balance Between Personal Privacy Jntae5tS and Organiwtionallnjerr

mation Needs, 44 ALB. L. REv.

589, 602 (1980); Simson L. Garfinkel, Putting Jl;[ore Teeth in
8, 1990, at 13; H1hat PTice Privacy?, CoN
REP., May 1991, at 356, 357. These articles stem from well-grounded complaints

Consumer Rights, CHRISTIAN Sci. MoNITOR, Aug.
su�tER

about the difficulties consumers face when, for instance, they try to correct inaccurate
credit reports.

8. See infm text accompanying notes 26-28.
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·oach, outlines its mechanics, and discusses its benefi ts. This Ar
:le concludes that a contractual solution would best balance the
dividual ' s desire for privacy against the rights of others to bene
. from the information e conomy.
I.

THE PRIVACY PROBLEM

Many people fear the loss of their privacy in a computerized
Jaked Society."9 O thers, however, are le$S concerned about the
�ed for privacy and may be unwilling to sacrifice the benefits
:nerated by the information economy. Thus, there is no con
nsus about the importance of privacy vis-a-vis the benefits of an
formation economy. One extreme solution, privacy for every
)dy, would deprive many people of benefits they value more
ghly; the other extreme, p rivacy for nobody, would disregard
,e strong privacy preference of others. 1 0 The law should eschew
,ese extremes in favor of the golden mean: a solution tailored
' individual preferences and values .
A.

Data Banks and the Threat to Privacy
1.

The Information Industry

Private data banks have mushroomed over the past few de
tdes, generating a spate of dire predictions .1 1 American com
Liters hold more than five billion records. On average , they
ade information on every man , woman, and child five times per
ay. 1 2 For instance, consumer credit bureaus hold 400 million
·edi t files and make possible 1.5 million c redit decisions each
ay. 13 More than one thousand local credit bureaus, operating
1rough three national networks, keep files on almost ninety per
:nt of American adults.14 Each mon th, bureaus receive informa
on about debtors from creditors; bureaus also check court
�cords and other sources.15 Credi t bureaus contain data on con9. VANCE PACKARD, THE NAKED SocrETY ( 1964).
10. See ir�(m Part III.
11. See generally Buru·aL-'.!-.1, supra note 4; DAVJD F. Lrl'JOWES, PRIVACY TN AMERICA: Is YouR
tTV.>.TE LIFE Il': THE PUBLIC EYE? ( 1989); RoBERT E. SMITH, PRrvAct: How To PROTECT
HAT's LEFT oF IT ( 1979); M.o\.Lcour W..\RNER & MrcHAEL STONE, THE 0.\TA BA.'>K SociETY:
RGANIL-'.TTONs, Co:.IPUTERS AND SociAL fREEoo:-..1 (1970).
12. jEFFREY RoTHFEDER, PRrvAGt FOR SALE 17 (1992) .
13. Leonard Sloane, Credit Bureaus Draw Fire for Misuse of Data, N.Y. T!,!ES, June 22,
)91, at 48.
14. lv7wl Price Privacy�, su,bra note 7, at 3.56. The three national bureaus are Equifax,
rans

Union, and TRW. !d.

15. See id.

at

356-.57.
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sumers' credit cards, loans, payment histories, bankruptcy lie ns
and judgments, past addresses, years of birth, and social security
numbers.16 Credit bureaus routinely sell this info rmatio n in the
form of mailing lists, enabling direc t-mail marketers to inundate
consumers with catalogues, solicitations, and special offers.17 In
1990, Lotus announced plans to use credit-bureau files to create
a personal-computer database containing the names, addresses,
demographic information, and purchasing habits of 120 million
consumers . 18
Databases are proliferating in other fields as well. Banks main
tain comprehensive files on their customers ' financial transac
tions. 1 9 The Employers' Information Service compiles lists of
employees who have filed workers' compensation claims and law
suits.20 O ther databases keep track of eviction filings, tenants
who damage apartments, and arrests for violen t and drug-related
crimes. 2 1 The MIB, which has health records on m ore than fif
teen million Americans, releases confidential medical informa
tion to insurance companies,22 and another database will soon
alert doctors to litigation-prone patients.23 Two large trade
groups are testing a pilot program that creates a database of peo
ple's high school records for use by employers.24 Finally, mailing
list databases rent out individuals' names up to tens of thousands
of times per year. 25
16.

See, e.g., TRvV CREDIT DATA SERVICES, UNDERSTANDit-;G TRW's CREDIT REPORTING

2, 8 (1992); see also Dave Barry, Credit Ra ntin gs, WASH. PosT, Nov. 18, 1990, Maga
zine, at 60; Simson L. Garfinkel, Privacy Issue Caught in Credit Network, CHRISTIAN Scr. MoNI
TOR, july 18, 1990, at 1; What Price Privacy�. supra note 7, at 357.
17. Se e, e.g., Simson L. Garfinkel, How Computers Help Tmget Buyers, CHRISTIAN SCI. Mot-;I
TOR, j uly 25, 1990, at 13; What Pri ce Privacy �. supra note 7, at 359-60.
18. Mary J. Culnan, An Issue of Consumer Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1992, § 3, at 9.
Lotus has cancelled this product, perhaps because of public complaints about the prod
uct's impact on their privacy. See Daniel Mendel-Black & Evelyn Richards, Peering I n to
Private Lives: Computer Lists Now Profi le Consumers by Their Person a l Habits, WAs! 1. PosT, Jan.
20, 1991, at H1 (stating that Lotus "could be forced to pull or delay the product" because
of compaints).
19. See S!'-IITH, supra note 11, at 15-28.
20. Richard Lacayo, Nowhere to Hide, TI,IE, Nov. 11, 1991, at 34.
21. Simson L. Garfinkel, From Database to Blacklist, CHRISTIAN SCI. Mo:-.�ITOR, Aug. 1,
1990, at 12.
22. !d. The MIB was formerly known as the Medical Information Bureau. !d. For an
interesting look at medical privacy, see Ted Cantrell, Privacy-The f.i[edical Problems, in
PRrvAC.Y 195 Oohn B. Young eel., 1978).
23. Tamar Lewin, Ph i l a delj1hia Doctors to Be Offered Data on Patients Who Have Sued, N.Y.
TI�!ES, Aug. 27, 1993, at A2l.
24. Lacayo, supra note 20, at 35.
25. RoTHFEDER, supra note 12, at 90.
SERVlCE

I

\
I
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Databases, however, do not contain everything about you. Con
trary to one writer's suggestion, Big Brother does not know about
"every sexual fantasy you [have ] had. "26 Credit bureaus, for in
stance, do not contain data on one's friends, relatives, religion,
cultural tastes, political affiliation, or sexual orientation .27 Thus a
credit bureau knows only "a very small part of the basic fac ts
about a consumer's existence, facts that a casual acquaintance
might know. "28 Reform proposals should focus on commonly
traded types of business information instead of being distracted
by sensationalist Orwellian claims about issues like sexual privacy.

2.

The State of the Law

The law imposes almost no restrictions on the sale of accurate
information . Databases may freely disclose information about
employment, criminal records, and tenants . No federal law pro
tec ts medical privacy, although Congress has considered such
legislation.29 No federal law safeguards the privacy of insurance
files.30 The only federal law on the privacy of bank information
forbids disclosure to the government but does not restrict sale to
private parties. 31 Laws place a few limits on the disclosure of
videocassette rentals,32 educational records,33 and cable televi
sion data,34 but there is no evidence that these were ever major
26. Barry, supra note 16, at 60 (all capitalized in original).
27. See TRW CREDIT DATA SERVICES, supra note 16, at 2; Daniel B. Klein & Jason
Richner, In Defense of the Credit Bureau, 12 CATO ]. 393, 397 (1992).
28. Klein & Richner, supra note 27, at 397.
29. ROTHFEDER, supra note 12, at 177.
30. Jd. at 27.
31. See Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.§§ 3401-34 (1988) (limiting conditions
under which government institutions may obtain bank records; giving customers a right
to authorize disclosure in writing and to revoke authorization at any time; and prohibit
ing banks from requiring such authorization as condition of doing business).
32. See Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988) (forbidding disclosure of
videocassette rental records except under court order, subpoena, warrant, or with express
contemporaneous written consent of consumer; requiring destruction of personally iden
tifiable information after one year; but permitting sale of names and addresses and past
rentals "if the disclosure is for the exclusive use of marketing goods and services directly
to the consumer"). This last loophole practically swallows the protection of the section.
33. See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C.§ 1232g (1988) (pertaining
to federally-funded schools) (guaranteeing parents access to educational records and for
bidding release of such records to others without written consent, subject to specified
exceptions). But cf Fay v. South Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 802 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1986) (hold
ing that the Act creates no private cause of action).
34. See Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1988) (prohibiting cable
operators from gathering or disclosing personally identifiable information without sub
scriber's prior consent unless (a) necessary for "a legitimate business acti\it';," (b) re
quired by court order, or (c) viewing habits are blocked out; also requiring cable
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sectors of the data trade .35 Although the Fair Credit Reporting
Act ostensibly limits disclosures by credit bureaus,36 some courts
have restricted its application to i naccurate i nformation . 37 The
statute, furthermore, permits a bureau to release a c onsumer
credit report to anyone deemed to have "a legitimate business
need" for the information.33 This exception has swallowed the
statute. 39 Thus credit bureaus routinely sell mailing lists, lists of
good debtors, and the like, without the slightest h i ndrance from
the law.4 0
S tate laws also fail to protect data privacy. Although many
states have made tortious the public disclosure of p rivate facts,41
these torts only cover highly offensive, private matters of no legitoperators to destroy personally identifiable information once retention is no longer
necessary).
35. The author has been unable to find a single case involving the commercial sale of
videocassette rentals, educational records, or cable television data.
36. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S. C.

§§

1681-1681 t (1988) (limiting permissible

reasons for releasing credit reports, forbidding reporting of obsolete information, and
requiring user of consumer credit reports to notify consumer when credit-report informa
tion causes user to deny consumer credit).
37. See Todd v. Associated Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 447, 449 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (holding that court need not reach issue of reasonableness if, as threshold matter,

credit report was accurate), ajfrl, 578 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir.), wt. denied, 439 U.S. 1068
(1978); Roseman v. Retail Credit Co., 428 F. Supp. 643, 646 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (holding that
an accurate report was not actionable because FCRA sought "to protect consumers from
having inaccurate inforrnation circulated concerning them"); Austin v. Bankamerica Scrv.

Corp., 419 F. Supp. 730, 732-33 (N.D. Ga. l974)(holding that accurate report docs not
violate FCRA); see also Pendleton v. Trans Union Sys. Corp., 76 F.R.D. 192, 195 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (denying class-action certification because of need to show that each class member
suffered inaccuracy); Virginia G. Maurer, Common Law Defamation and the Fair Credit Repm
ing Act, 72 CEO. L.J. 95, 124 (1984) (stating that "in general, courts are unwilling to permit
actions under section l68lo when the information in the report is true").
38. See 15 U.S.C.

§

l6S1b (1988) (limicing consumer credit repon disclosure to situa

tions invoiving court orders, written instructions by the consumer, creditors, employers,
insurers, government benefit programs, and others having "a legitimate business need").
39. RoTHFEDEfl.,

supra

note 12, at 55, 57 (stating that the bill "has been butchered; it

was drawn and quartered and it.s vitals were left on the committee's chopping block" by

the insertion of "[t]his remarkably broad exception" at the urging of industry lobbyists
(quoting Professor Arthur Miller of Han•ard Law School)); see also Bonnie G. Camden,
Comment, Fai,. Credit Reporting Act: What You Don't Know May Hwt You, 57 U. CrN. L. R.F.v.

267, 267 (1988) (''The [Fair Credit Reporting Act], as interpreted today, frequently aJlm,·s

dissemination of credit reports to people v.ithout a legitimate need for the reports.").
Businesses, furthermore, have evaded the Act's strictures by obtaining reports fOI- pur
poses not listed in the statute. According to some courts, such reports are not "consumer
reports" and thus fall out-;ide the statute. See, e.g., Houghton v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.,
795 F.2d 1144, 1148-49 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that report obtained by insurance com
pany about claimant's financial status

was

not consumer report because no consumer

relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant); Henry
8

(D.

v.

Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5, 6,

Minn. l 976) (iinding that report obtained by attorney for use in lobbying

w<�.s

not

consumer report because it was not prepared for one of the specific statutory purposes).
40.

RoTHFF.DER, suj;ra

note 12, at 26, 98 (noting that, for decades, industry has been

seiling lists of consumers without hindrance by the Fair Credit Reporting Act).
41. See

generally REsTATU·!ENT (Sccoc.:o) OF ToRTS§

6520 (1963 & App. 1977-1989).
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imate public concern.42 Typically, data dissemination does not
involve publicity as courts have defined the term,43 and i t rarely
involves highly offensive matters. As a result, "courts have usually
rejected [ privacy-tort ] claims based on information privacy. "44
Th us neither s tate nor federal law provides much data privacy
p rotection.
3.

Privacy Concerns

Many people care about data privacy. In a 1 990 poll, seventy
nine percent of those polled were concerned about their per
sonal p rivacy.45 Almost half of those surveyed thought " technol
ogy had go tten out of control . "46 Even a decade ago, one third of
Americans feared that we were on the verge of an Orwellian soci
e ty lacking all privacy.47 Reacting to this crisis, Congress has con
sidered several data-privacy bills in recent years.48
Several themes recur in the complaints of privacy advocates.
First, data subjects are unaware of the use of their data.49 Second,
42. !d.
43. Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of
Personal Information, 65 TEx. L. REv. 1395, 1 4 1 3 ( 1 987) ( citing Santiesteban v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. , 306 F.2d 9, 1 1 (5th Cir. 1962)).
44. !d.
45. vVhat Price Privacy?, supra note 7, at 356 (summarizing results of 1 990 Harris p o ll
c o m m i ssioned by Equifax, Inc.).
46. !d.
47. Louis HARRIS & AssociATES, Ir--:c. & ALAN F. W E STI N, THE DIMENSIONS OF PRrvACY 5
( 1 98 1 ).
48. See, e.g., Consumer Reporting Reform Act, S. 783, 1 03d Cong., 1 st Sess. ( 1 993);
Consumer Reporting Reform Act, H.R. 1 0 1 5 , 103d Cong., 1 st Sess. ( 1 993); Credit Rep o rt
ing Agencies Accuracy of Consumer Information Act, H.R. 6 1 9 , 1 03d Cong., lst Sess.
( 1 993); Fair Credit Reporting Amendments, H.R. 630, 1 03d Cong. , 1 st Sess. ( 1 993); Indi
vidual Privacy Protection Act, H.R. 1 35 , 1 03d Cong. . 1 st Sess. ( 1 993).
Congress has considered other bills. The Consumer Credit Reporting Act would have
tighted restrictions on the use and sale of credit reports. Time for Credit Horror Stories to
End, L.A. TI�IES, Aug. 9, 1 992, at M4 (noting that the bill will be considered in 1 993).
Representatives Richard Lehman, Charles Sc humer, and Matthew Rinaldo have intro
duced bills to tighten access to credit reports. The bills would both lim it marketers' access
to report<; and require deletion of old information. Garfinkel, Putting lv1ore Teeth in Con
sumer Rights, supra note 7, at 1 3 ; see also Michael W. Mil ler, Credit-Reporting Industry Will
Launch Campaign to Forestall New Regulations, WALL ST. J., June 5, 1 99 1 , at B 1 ( sL"l.ting that
Congress at that time was considering five bills that would have tightened access to credit
reports). Representative Bob ·wise has introduced a proposal to create a federal data
protection board. Lacayo, supra note 20, at 35. At least three Congressional committees
have held hearings on personal-data gathering. See Michael W. Mil ler, Hot Lists: Data !Vlills
Delve Deep to Find lnfonnation A. bout Us Consumers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1 4, 1 99 1 , at Al. Finally,
Representative Schumer has sponsored a bill to curtail tenant-screening networks. Pam
Belluck, Tenants Cry Foul as Screening Companies HfijJ Landlards Spot 'Problem' Applicants,
WALL Sr . .J., Dec. 27, 1985, at 1 3.
49. Culnan, supra note 1 8, at 9; Gat·finkel, How Computers Help Tmget Buyers, supra note
17, at 13.
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data gatherers routinely use information gathered ostensibly for
one purpose, such as getting credit, for other purposes unanti ci
pated by the data subject, such as employment and mailing
lists.5° Finally, data subjects lack control over what happens after
they release information.5 1
B.
1.

The Untold Side of the Story

There Is No Consensus on the Importance of Privacy

" [ O ] ur society is at least ambivalent about the [i mportance of]
personal privacy," because indivi duals ' rights to privacy conflic t
with others' rights to know the truth .52 As one writer stated, " [i ] t's
hard to find a national consensus on confidentiality in a nation
of tell-all memoirs, i nquiring pollsters and talk shows .... "53 Half
of those surveyed did not fear the improper use of information
by business.54 Privacy, moreover, is a very subjective and mutable
concept. "vVhat is private to one individual may not be private to
his neighbor; what is considered private today may not be consid
ered private tomorrow."55 Thus, Americans share n o consensus
about the value of privacy.56
2. The Benefits of an Information E conomy

The uninhibited flow of financial information makes possible
the liberal provision of credit.57 It enables creditors to trust con
sumers about whom they have no first-hand knowledge.58 Accu50. See, e.g., Garfinkel, How Computers Help Target Buyers, mpra note 1 7 , at 1 3; Lacayo,
supra note 20, at 36 (discussing use of warranty-registration cards to generate stereo- and
record-company mailing lists); Jacob Sul l u m , SaTets for Sale: Do Strangers with Computers
Know Too l'viuch About You?, REASON, Apr. 1 992, at 28, 32 (noting that privacy advocates
argue "the Erst rule of info rmational p ri vacy [is]: Informati o n disclosed for one purpose
should not be used for another p urpose without the subject's c onseEt").
51 . See Culnan, supra note 1 8, at 9; Mendel-Black & Richards, supra note 1 8 , at H l.
52. Diane L. Zim m erman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandt-is's
Privacy Tort, 68 CoR�ELL L. REv. 291 , 326 ( 1 983).
53. Lacayo, supra note 20, at 34.
54. Lours HARRIS & AssociATES, INc. 8.: WEsTIN svjna note 47, at 5 ( finding that 50% of
those surveyed in 1978 d i d not worry about business misuse of personal information).
55. ERIK GeRsoN, THE NAKED CoNSUMER 1 0 ( 1 992).
56. This lack of consensus holds true even if one assumes that one-third o f the uncon
cerned 50% (see suf!Ta note 54) are unconcerned solely because they are i gnorant about
how information is sol d . Under such an assumption, 33% of the consumers would not
care about the diminution of data privacy.
57. Jeremiah Smith, Conditional Privilege for lvlercantile Agencies-Macintosh v. Dun pt. l,
1 4 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 87 , 1 99 ( 1 914); Stephen Chapman, C redit Report: Friend or Foe>, WAsi-l.
Trw:s, June 1 0, 1 99 1 , at F2; see also Fair Credit Reporting Act, 1 5 U. S.C. § 1 581(a) ( l )
( 1988); H. Hart, Privacy in the Financial Field, in PruVACY, supra note 22, at 259, '279.
58. Klein & Richner, sujna note 2 7 , at 396-97.
,
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rate credit-history information allows creditors to charge lmver
i nterest rates to reliable debtors, thus encouraging all debtors to
keep their promises. By turning consumers into repeat players,
i nformation networks overcome the incentives to cheat creditors
in a prisoner's dilemma.59 Individuals benefit as well as busi
nesses. Even one staunch critic of data dissemination admits that
credit bureaus make it possible for the middle class to obtain
both credit and lower prices. 6 0 Thus, people with sound credit
ratings have reason to favor the dissemination of their credit
histories.
The same logic applies to networks of landlords and employ
ers: The dissemination of truthful information rewards good ten
ants and employees and punishes defaulters and shirkers.
Tenants who default on rent and damage apartments create costs
that landlords pass on to other tenants. Tenants who turn their
apartments into brothels or shops for illegal drugs worsen the
quality of life for other tenants. Information networks allow land
lords to screen out bad tenants, saving good tenants money and
keeping out criminal activity and nuisances. 61
Even the much-maligned j unk-mail industry serves a purpose.
Many consumers er�joy receiving mailings and shopping at
home. 6 2 Mail-order shopping is convenient for those with small
59. See Daniel B. Klein, Promise Keeping in the Great Society: A J'vlodel of Credit Information
Sharing, 4 EcoN. & PoL. 1 17 ( 1992). See generally R o BERT AxELROD, THE EvoLUTION OF
CooPERATION (1984) (demonstrating the importance of knowledge of past behavior and
reciprocity in overcoming prisoner's dilemmas).
The prisoner's dilemma is the name given to certain types of coordination problems in
which each participant has an incentive to act selfishly even though cooperation would
maximize their joint welfare. For a common example, suppose that the police have ar
rested two thieves. The police take the prisoners into separate interrogation rooms and
seek to make each one confess and testify against the other prisoner. If both prisoners
remain silent, each will serve two years in jail. If one prisoner confesses while the other
remains silent, the confessing prisoner will go free while the other prisoner will serve six
years. If both prisoners confess, each prisoner will serve five years in jail. Under these
circumstances, each prisoner has an incentive to confess and thus serve either zero or five
years instead of two or six years. The best joint outcome would be for both thieves to
remain silent and serve two years each; however, because of the coordination problem,
the thieves probably will not both remain silent. For a numerical version of this scenario,
see id. at 8-10.
60. ROTHFE D ER , supra note 12, at 43.
61. See Belluck, supra note 48, at 11. But cf Garfinkel, From Database to Blacklist, supra
note 2 1 (reciting anecdotal complaints of tenants and attorneys concerning tenant
databases).
62. Daniel Klein & Jason Richner, In Defense of that Pesky Junk J'vlail, CI-ll. TRIB., Apr. 20,
1992, § 1, at 19; see also LINOWES, supra note 11, at 153. Some consumers actually pay
money to have their names put on certain mailing lists. What Price Privacy?, supra note 7, at
360. One study finds that 88% of people accept direct mail when they have the option of
discontinuing it. Klein & Richner, supra, at 19.
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children, physical disabilities, or insufficient time to go to
stores.63 Strengthening the mail-order industry creates manufac
turingjobs and reduces pollution and traffic congestion, because
consumers no longer have to drive to malls.64 More precise infor
mation enables marketers to target only those consumers m os t
likely to want to receive particular mailings, thereby reducing
mailing costs and conserving paper. 65
We must balance the value of the information i ndustry against
i ts costs in order to decide under what circumstances privacy is
worthwhile . Because tradeoffs are i nvolved, the law should avoid
conferring too much privacy or too little. Any solution should
reflect individuals' varying valuations of privacy and the counter
vailing benefits .66
II.

PROPOSED SoLUTIONs

Legislators and pundits have proposed data-privacy solutions
involving legislation, regulation, state constitutional rights, and
tort law. These approaches would require government officials to
decide for everyone what tradeoffs are worth making for privacy.
The proposals' centralized, one-size-fits-all solutions contrast with
this Article's individuated solution .
A.

Legislative and Regulatory Solutions

Some commentators have called for Congress to enact s trin
gent statutory measures.67 Each of the past four Congresses has
considered legislation to establish a federal Data Protection
Board.68 The Consumer Credit Reporting Act, considered in
63. Klein & Richner,
64. See id.
65. !d.
66. See infra Part

III

supra note

62, at 19.

(discussing how centralized solutions fall into the ali-or-nothing

trap).

67. See, e.g., Co/\tPUTER PROFESSIONALS FOR SociAL REsPONSIBILITY & U.S. PRIVACY CouN

CIL, 1991 R EPO RT,

quoted in Sullum, supra note 50, at 30 (supporting a stringent legislative

solution); L>.RSON,

supra

note 55, at 237-39 (arguing for a flexible Omnibus Privacy Act

and a constitutional privacy amendment); ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AssAULT oN PRIVACY:
CoMPUTERS, DATA BA."'KS, AND DossiERS, 185, 213, 220-38 (1971) (arguing that instead of

leaving responsibility to individuals and letting "placebo" of consent operate, government

should set up st.c1tutes or regulations); AL\N F. vVESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOi\1 386-88
(1970) (advocating detailed legislative planning and administrative rules); !vliller, supra
note 7, at 1170, 1229-44 (proposing tightening of statutory protection); Camden, su;bm
note 39, at 292 (same); Murdock, supra note 7, at 610 (advocating federal legislation and
administrative agency).
68. See H.R. 685, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 3669, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989);

H.R. 638, 100th Cong., lst Sess. (1987); H.R. 1721, 99th Cong., lst Se�s. (1985).
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would have tightened restrictions on the use and sale of
reports.69 Congress, moreover, has recently held a flurry of
edit
cr
h earings on possible restrictions on the sale of consumer data.70
Others argue that Congress should pass enabling legislation to
allow administrative regulations and an independent agency or
commissioner to regulate data privacy.71 This administrative ap
proach parallels that of many European countries, which have
passed data-privacy legislation setting up centralized data protec
tion boards.72 One purported virtue of the administrative ap
proach is its flexibility and responsiveness to technological
changes and new threats.73 Spiros Simitis argues that laws should
1 993,

69.

Time for Credit Horror Stories to End, supra

note 48, at A24.

70. At least three congressional committees h ave held hearings on the subject.
Miller,

Hot Lists: Data Mills Delve Deep to Find Information About Us Consumers, supra note

See
48,

at A l .
71. See Miller, supra note 7,
grams: A Threat to Privacy ?, 15
supra note 7, at 610.

a t 1236; Kenneth

C O LUI.!.

J . L. &

J.

Langan, Note,

Computer Match ing Pro

Soc. PRoBs. 143, 177-78 (1979) ; Murdock,

72. In 1 984, Britain adopted the Data Protection Act.

See Data

Protection Act, 1984, ch.

35 (Eng.). It requires data gatherers to register with a Data Protection Registrar.

!d. §§ 4-

5. Data subjects enjoy rights of access to data, compensation for unauthorized disclosure
or access or inaccurate data, and correction or erasure of inaccurate or misleading data.

!d. §§

21-24. D a ta users must follow eight data protection principles: 1 ) One must get and

process information fairly and lawfully. 2) One may only hold it for specified and lawful
purposes. 3) Data must be adequate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to that pur
pose. 4) One may not use data for purposes other than those for which one gathered it.
5) Data must be accurate. 6) One must not keep data longer than necessary. 7) One must
inform data subjects of the existence of data on them and give them rights of access and
correction. 8) Finally, data bureaus must take appropriate security measures.

!d.

sched. I ,

STE RLIN G , T H E DATA PROTECTION ACT 1984: A GuiDE T O T H E NEw

pt. 1;

see also J.A.L.

Back?,

48 Moo. L. REv. 190, 192-93 ( 1 985 ) .

LEGISLATION 'l! 'll 1250, 1 2 60 (1985); Ian J. Lloyd ,

The Data Protection Act-Little Brother Fights

Other countries have similar centralized solutions. The Irish Data Protection Act of
1988 employs the same eight principles as the British Act.
TECTION

L\w

IN

See

RoBERT CL\RK, DATA P R o.

IRELAND 1 8, 45-57 (1990 ) . Co mp a re Irish Data Protection Act, No. 25

( 1 988) (lr.) and Data Protection Act, 1 984, ch. 35 (Eng.)

with

Council of Europe, Conven

tion for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data (Strasbourg 1981) (showing that all three acts share nearly identical wording of
eight principle s ) . The Irish Act also sets up a Data Protection Com missioner to enforce
compliance. The Irish system pays little attention to individual wishes: "The entry on the
register rather than the wishes of the data subject determine [sic] how use and disclosure

is to be policed by the Commissioner." C L\RK,

mpra,

at 18. The European Union has

considered a proposed directive on data privacy. It would have required member states to
set up a centralized supervisory authority to which data gatherers would have had to re
port. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection of Individuals in Rela
tion to the Processing of Personal Data, 1990 O.J. (C 277) 3, 7, 1 1 . Cf Proposal for a
Council Directive Concerning the Protec tion of Personal Data and Privacy in the Context
of Public Digital Telecommunications Networks, in Particular the Integrated Services Dig
ital Nenvork (ISDN) and Public Digital Mobile Nenvorks, 1990 O J. (C 277) 1 2. Germany,
Norway, and Austria have set up dat..1 protection commissioners or cen tral executive agen
cies. Spiros Simitis,
(19 8 7 ) .

73. See

Miller,

Reviewing Privacy in an lnfonnation Soc iety,

supra

note 7 , a t 1236; Murdock,

supra

135 U. PA. L. REv. 707, 745

note 7, at 6 18.
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set up independent commissioners capable of continually updat
ing regulations.74 Countries, he says, need a "mandatory frame
work" i nsensitive to individual wishes, because data subjects
"cannot determine the proper data processing conditions. "75
This mindset, paradoxically, ignores i ndividuality in the name of
protecting i ndividuals.
B.

Constitutional Protection of Data Privacy

Several authors have suggested that the constitutional right of
due process protects an i ndividual ' s liberty i nterest in privacy or
property i nterest in controlling personal i nformation.76
Although the U .S . Supreme Court has never squarely addressed
this argument, dicta in 'Whalen v. Roe77 suggest that such an argu
ment might succeed.
In ·whalen, the Court upheld New York's maintenance and use
of a computer database listing users of certai n prescri ption drugs
against liberty and privacy challenges under the Fourteenth
Amendment.78 The Court, however, " [r ] ecogni z [ e d ] that in some
circumstances [the] duty [to avoid unwarranted disclosure of
data] arguably has its roots in the Constitution . "79 Because this
case involved state action , the current Court is unlikely to extend
any such due process right into a property i nterest enforceable
against private parties.80 A constitutional solution, however, re74. Simitis, supra note 72, at 741 -43, 745.
75. Id. at 736-37.
76. See Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy,
71 B.U. L. REv 1 33, 1 35 (1991) (advocating both liberty and property protection and the
use of an intermediate scrutiny analysis). Two other commentators have suggested similar
proposals but have restricted their foci to privacy rights against the government. See Rob
ert S. Peck, Extending the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the New Technological Age, 12 HoF
STRA L. REv. 893, 898 ( 1 984) (advocating extension of constitutional right to privacy to
"withholding personal information" from the government); Heyward C. Hosch III, Note,
The Interest in Limiting the Disclosure of Personal Information: A Constitutional Analysis, 36
VAND. L. REv. 1 41, 1 42-43, 179 ( l 983)(arguing "for the establishme nt of a fourteenth
amendment liberty interest in limited disclosure" protected by rational relation review).
One other author has argued for the constitutional recognition of a property right in
information, though he has not applied that theory to individual p rivacy. See Michael A.
Dryja, Infonnation as Property: Philosophy, Economics, and the Constitution, 25-4 1 ( Oct.
1 992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the HARv. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y) .
77. 429 U.S. 602 (1977).
78. !d. at 603-04 & n.32.
79. !d. at 605. Concurring, Justice Brennan put this point even more strongly: " [T] he
Constitution puts limits . . . on the means [the state] may use to gather" information. !d. at
607 ( Brennan, J., concurring).
80. The Fourteen th Amendment's protection of life, liberty, and property only extends
to deprivation by state action; it does not forbid purely private conduct. See Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 4 1 9 U.S. 345 (1974) (limiting state action to traditional public
functions and duties and refusing to extend doctrine to all businesses affected with public
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mains feasible because s tate courts could interpret their state
c o nstitutions to protect privacy even in the absence of state
ac tion.81
C.

The Tort of Commercial Dissemination of Private Facts

One commentator has rej ected statutory solutions because
" the inflexible nature of an across-the-board s tatutory remedy
might render the remedy inadequate to deal with the fluid na
ture of the information economy. "82 Applauding the flexibility,
innovative capacity, and insulation of courts, he has proposed
making tortious the "unacceptable . . . commercial dissemination
of private facts. "83 He j ustifies the creation of this tort on the
basis of the perceived "violat[ion of] our society's shared expecta
tions of privacy. "84 Under this approach, courts would "evaluate
the quality of the information exchanged" and decide what "nec
essary and beneficial " dissemination merits protection.85 Courts
can best balance in dividual privacy interests against the public
benefi ts of dissemination, he argues .86 This author provides few
concrete details about how j udges and j uries should handle this
task.
I II.

PROBLEMS W1 T H CENTRALIZED APPROACHES

The statu tory, constitutional, and tort solutions do not respect
individual perceptions and valuations of privacy. They adopt
Simi tis ' view that " [ w] hether or not th e details of the intended
re trieval are explained to them . . . [data subjects] cannot deter
mine the proper data processing conditions. "87 The tort solutio n,
for example, requires j udges t o balance the utility of dissemina
tion against the value of privacy to a reasonable person. It thus
interest) .

See genaally GEOFFR!.>' R. SToNE ET AL., CoNSTITUTIONAL L"w

199 1 ) .

8 1 . F o r instance, the Cal ifornia Constitution protects privacy.

1 593- 1 66 1 (2d ed.

See CAL. CaNsT.

art. I , § 1

(iisting righ t of privacy as inalienable right of all people) . The California Supreme Court

has suggested that this protec tiotl applies against corporations
ernment.

See White

as

well as against the gov

v. D avis, 533 P.2d 222, 234 (Cal. 1975) (en bane) (stating in d i c tu m

that the legislative history of the privacy amendment shows that i t embraces "overbroad
collection and rete n tion [ and improper use] of u n n ecessary personal information by gov

ern m e n t and business in teres ts " ) ; 7 BERNAP�T) E. TWlTKI N , Su�lliL-\.RY or C.-\LIFORNL\ L-\.w
§ 454 (9th ed. l98S) (same).
82. Graham,

supra

n o te 43, at 1 424.

83. lrl. at 1 426, 1 428, 1 430.

84. /d. a t 1430.

85. Jd. at 1 428, 1 430.

&
supra

86. ld. at 1 423

87. S i m i r.is,

n.l49.
note 72,

at

736;

see

supm text

acc o m panying note 75.
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implicitly relies on a societal j udgment about the unacceptability
of particular disclosures.88 Any such uniform standard based on
the p references of a non-existent reasonable p e rson would im
perfectly assess and allocate the social costs of withholding infor
mation . People's individual valuations of privacy vary greatly
from those of a reasonable person .89 A tort solution, therefore,
would give those who place a high value on p rivacy less of it tha n
they desire and those indifferent to privacy more of i t than they
want.90
Price theory buttresses this argument. As Nobel Laureate econ
omist Friedrich von Hayek notes, there is no obj ective scale of
values for commodities.91 Therefore, central planning cannot
"compare or assess the relative importance of needs of different
persons. "92 Because " demand is built up of innumerable incom
mensurable scales of valuation," centralized solutions cannot
take into accoun t and satisfy "individuals' subj ec tive valuations"
and tradeoffs.93 Central plans, therefore, would allocate re
sources i nefficiently:94 They would keep some information pri
vate although it would be worth more to m erchants , and they
would permit dissemination of other data the p rivacy of which
people value highly. Each such case, whether it i nvolves the re
lease of too li ttle information or too much, would produce an
inefficient outcome.
In contrast, the price mechanism takes into accoun t individual
values, needs, and tradeoffs, allocating resources to their most
valued uses.95 Pricing, unlike central plan ning, respects con
sumer preferences.96 It adjusts resource-allocation decis i ons to
maximize value and swiftly takes changed circumstances i n to ac88. See sujna text accompanying n o tes 84-86.
89. See supra Part I . B . l .
90. O f course, this i s true o f all torl<;. The law-and-economics explanation for why the
law i m p oses tort liabili ty is that "transaction costs with pote n ti a l victims . . . are proh ibi
tive. " RICHARD A. PosNER, Ecor-.:o:-,uc ANAJ.YSrs OF LAw 1 64 (4th eel. 1 99 2 ) . That rationale
does not apply here because the data subject and data gatherer c o m municate and can
bargain freely ( except perhaps i n a monopoly situation) .
9 1 . Friedrich A. von Hayek, Socialist Calculation 1: The Nature and H istory of the Problem, in
INDIVJDUALIS�d Ai'-:D Eco:'-lo�Hc ORDER 1 1 9 , 1 37 ( 1 949) .
92. Jd.
93. Georg Halrn, Further Considerations on the Possibility of A dequ a te Calcu lation in a Social
ist Community ( H . E . Batson trans. ) , in CoLLECTIVJST EcoNO�IIC PL�'INii'-:G 1 3 1 , 1 83 ( Fried
rich A. von Hayek eel . , 1 93 5 ) .
94. !d. at 1 45 .
9 5 . ld. a t 1 4 1 , 1 45 .
96. Friedrich A . v o n Hayek, The Present State of the Debate, i n Co LLECTf\1ST EcoNO�IIC
PL\:'-i i'-:!NG, sujJra n o te 93, at 20 1 , 2 1 5 .
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count.97 It i s a prerequisite for rational economic decisions:
"Wi thout a pricing mechanism, there is no economic calcula
ti on."98 A contractual approach, by pricing information, would
thus more efficiently allocate data than would a centrally
planned solution.
The importance of varied individual preferences becomes
clearer if one considers a hypothetical: A mail-order retailer
holds data on ten consumers ' buying habits . The ten consumers
attach widely differing values to the privacy of their buying hab
its. cl values her privacy at $ 1 , c2 values his privacy at $2, and so
on up to C 10, who values her privacy at $ 1 0. A typical merchant,
M, values each set of data at $6.50. One blanket rule for this sce
nario would offer no privacy because M' s valuation is higher than
those of the majority of the consumers. Such a one-size-fits-all
rule is insensitive to individual wishes . C 7, C 8, C 9, and C 1 0 respec
tively value their privacy $0.50, $ 1 .50, $ 2 . 50, and $3.50 more than
M values their information, yet they cannot protect their privacy.
If instead the blanket rule protected everyone ' s privacy, C 1
through c6 would receive privacy that is worth less t o them than
the information is worth to M. From an efficiency standpoint,
information should be put to its most-valued use. Therefore , the
latter rule would inefficiently deny �;1 access to some of the data.
Ideally, a solution should fi t its problem. In the case of regula
tion of the information industry, perceptions and valuations of
the privacy problem vary too greatly for a conventional, central
ized solution to fit well. \Ve must therefore turn to the branch of
the common law most sensitive to individual preferences:
contracts .
IV.

A CoNTRACTUAL SoLUTION
A.

The Common

Law

Contracting parties, in theory, may freely draw up contracts
specifying conditions of confidentiality.99 Classical contract law
alone, however, will not solve the privacy problem. I ndividuals
release information in standard form contracts yet lack the
von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in li'DIVIDUALIS�t AND Eco
supra note 9 1 , at 77, 87, 103.
98. Ludwig von Mises, Die Wirtschaftsrechnung im s oz ialis t is ch e n Gemeinwesen, 47 ARCHTV
FUR SoziALv\1SSENSCHAFTEN ( 1 920), translated and reprinted as Economic Calculation in the
Socialist Commonwealth (S. Adler trans.) , in CoLLECT!V1ST EcONOM I C PLANNING, supra note
97. Friedrich A.

NOMIC ORDER,

93,

at

87, 111.

99. See GoRDON HuGHES, DATA PROTECTION

rl'i

AusTRALIA 22Jr-29 ( 1 99 1 ).

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

606

[Vol. 1 7

p ower to renegotiate these contracts. Unequal bargain ing
p ower 1 00 and start-up transaction costs preven t i ndividual co n
sumers from i nsisting on contractual rights to privacy. 1 01 No o n e
business will absorb the costs of redrafting standard forms, i mple
menting privacy p rocedures, and educating consumers. 1 0 2
B.

How Contractual Data Privacy ·would vVork

A federal statute would require users of standard form con
tracts to include an opt-in or opt-out clause. 1 03 The clause would
govern release of information that the data subject disclosed to
the data gatherer on that form or in later transactions pursuan t
to that form. 1 04 The penalty for failure to include such an o p tion
1 00. MILLER, supra note 67, at 2 1 4.
1 0 1 . In most transactions, the value of privacy to consumers, while significant, is proba

bly dwarfed by the start-up transaction costs involved and by other considerations. For
example, an individual desiring a Visa card will accept a bank's standard no-privacy terms
when the cost of renegotiating the standard terms exceeds the difference between the
value of privacy to the individual and the value of information to the bank. This is true
even if his privacy is worth more to him than the information is worth to the bank.
Additionally, consumers face enforcement problems. See infra note 1 08 for this Arti
cle's free-market enforcement scheme. A privacy right is worth little to consumers if there
is no enforcement mechanism to back it up. It m ight not be worth the trouble for busi
nesses to start up privacy schemes because consumers would have no assurance that busi
nesses were delivering the promised privacy. There is a chicken-and-egg problem here:
Information sleuths (enforcers) will not come into existence until there is a big enough
market to assure steady business and allow for economies of scale. Consumers, however,
will not demand contractual privacy rights until there is an enforcement industry to make
those rights meaningful. This Article's proposal would solve this quandary by creating a
flood of privacy rights at once, thus encouraging information sleuths to commit time and
capital to building up enforcement businesses.
1 02. There may be isolated circumstances where transaction costs are so low and pri
vacy is worth so much to consumers that a business will offer options of its own accord. In
most industries, however, the start-up cost of establishing options and unilaterally i nform
ing consumers about their options would exceed the good>vili gai n ed by the business.
Although spreading the consumer-education costs over all businesses would reduce the
cost, the transaction costs of coordinating education expenditures would be prohibitively
high.
1 03. The choice of an opt-in or opt-out clause would be tied to the selection of a de
fault rule. See infra note 1 06. If the default rule provided privacy, the form would have an
opt-out clause; otherwise it would have an opt-in clause.
1 04. For example, if a consumer requested privacy on a cred i t-card application, the
credit-card company would have to keep private all information disclosed on that form
and disclosed in the course of subsequent credit-card purchases.
Special problems arise in the credit context because credit bureaus do not contract
directly with debtors. Presumably credit bureaus could be made parties to the contract on
an agency theory. The credit-card companies would contract as agents of the credit bu
reaus. Under the law of agency for partially disclosed or undisclosed principals, both the
credit-card companies and credit bureaus would be bound by the terms of the contracts.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1 44, 1 86, 3 2 1 -22 ( 1 958) . Alternatively, the
credit-card companies could fully disclose their principals by naming the credit bureaus
to which they planned to disclose daLe\ . They could then contract to bind their principals
to secrecy (on an agency theory) and additionally contract to bind themselves (under an
ordi nary bilateral contract) . See id. §§ 1 44, 320.
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would be i mposition of an implied contractual duty not to spread
th e information outside the corporation or other entity. 1 0 5 The
1 6
default rule (governing those who did not sign the clause) 0
would match the p revailing expectations and practices in that
typ e of business. 1 07 Public ignorance might necessitate a public
se rvice advertisement campaign to inform people of their privacy
rights. Market incentives would encourage private agents to po
lice p rivacy violations. 108
1 05. Thus, businesses that had no desire to disseminate information could save the cost
of including the clause.
106. A default rule is a rule that fills gaps in contracts. It would specify, for a particular
type of form, either that failure to sign the clause will result in privacy protection or that it
will not. The orthodox view in contract law is that the law should set default terms at what
most parties would have chosen had they explicitly addressed the issue. See, e.g. , PosNER,
supra note 90, at 93; Charles ]. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a
General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 9 7 1 ( 1 98 3 ) ; see also Lewis v.
Benedict Coal Corp., 3 6 1 U.S. 459, 468-69 ( 1 960) (applying this approach to setoffs of
pension contributions) . Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, however, have noted that some
times it is more efficient for the law to choose default rules that do not mimic parties'
hypothetical desires. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theary of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87, 91 ( 1 989) . Two of their considerations
apply to the information industry. First, consumers desiring privacy are p robably more
likely to contract around a no-privacy default than consumers not desiring privacy are to
contract around a privacy default. This factor weighs in favor of setting the default rule at
no privacy. See id. at 93. Second, many consumers are unlikely to know of a no-privacy
default. This factor supports setting the default rule at p rivacy, so that businesses have to
inform the uninformed consumers to get them to opt out of privacy. See id. at 98. These
two considerations point in opposite directions and, absent empirical evidence to the
contrary, would seem to cancel each other out. The logical solution, therefore, would
minimize the disruption of business by setting the default equal to whatever the currently
p revailing norms are in an industry: for example, bank accounts would enjoy privacy (and
so would have opt-out clauses) but magazine subscriptions would not (and so would have
opt-in clauses) .
1 07 . Presumably Congress would ascertain these business expectations by making use
of an investigatory subcommittee or independent agency. But these default rules should
not be constantly revised; to respect contracting parties' expectations and reliance, the
Jaw should be stable and secure.
1 08. Instead of relying on an inefficient government body to police violations, this con
tractual scheme would generate policing by a band of information sleuths. ( Data subject.�
could sue as well, but proving violations would be difficult unless the data subject had
released a particular datum to only one business.) Entrepreneurs would submit decoy
entries to various data banks via pseudonymous credit card applications, magazine sub
scriptions, insurance applications, and the like. On the forms, the sleuths would request
privacy for all information. If the decoys began receiving mail from outside the data
gathering corporation, the sleuths would have proof of a violation and could sue for clam
ages. These damages should be set at a statutory sum of liquidated damages plus attor
ney's fees because it would be impossible to prove the quantum of actual damages. The
attorney's fees provision would be analogous to the law of derivative shareholder suits
against corporations. See, e.g., REYlSED MoDEL BusiNESS CoRP. Acr § 7.46 ( 1 984) . The fee
award would encourage attorneys to police violations, turning them into private attorneys
general.

One could supplement this sleuthing scheme with rewards for whistle-blowing employ
ees who revealed breaches of contractual privacy.
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Users of standard forms would then have to offer i n duceme nts
for the right to sell information, leading the m arket to price pri
vacy efficiently. Market p ricing would allocate information to its
most-valued uses. Although a statute would p rovide the impetus,
this approach would not be centrally planned; rather, the valu a
tions and tradeoffs would rest on i ndividuals ' choices instead of
blanket statutory determinations. I t is impossible to tell a priori
whether this solution would i ncrease or decrease the flow of data,
but that inquiry is i rrelevant. What matters, as Part III argues, is
that market pricing based on individual preferences would caus e
i nformation to flow to its most-valued uses.
The market's treatment of silence will depend upon the type
of data and the circumstances of the silence . With some types of
data, such as mailing lists, data buyers will be unable to tell that
an individual has opted for privacy (as opposed to not being
listed i n a database i n the first place ) . The market, therefore, will
not draw adverse inferences from a person's choosing privacy. In
m any other situations, many people will opt for privacy because
they value it highly. When many people do so, the marke t will
only read that choice as indicating that people value their privacy
high ly. The market under these circumstances will n ot impose
significant costs on privacy.
The interesting case occurs when most people value their p ri
vacy very little: Only those with something to hide and extreme
privacy lovers ( call them hermits ) will choose privacy. I n such
situations, the market will read opting for p rivacy as a sign of
concealment of damaging facts. It will then spread the costs of
the p resumed damaging facts (for example, bad credit history)
over the privacy choosers ( for example, by charging higher in te r
est rates) . Those concealing damaging facts deserve to pay this
premium, because as Posner notes, "others have a legitimate in
terest in unmasking the deception" and charging concealers ac
curate rates. 1 09 But what of the hermit? As noted above ,
centralized solutions rest on shared social expectations of what
should be private 1 1 0 and therefore would deny the hermit any
privacy beyond what the maj ority wants . Because the majority will
1 09. Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393, 395, 399-400
( 1 978) (stating that individuals have i n terest in discovering truth of those they deal wi.th
instead of taking deceptive representations at face value and that inquiry is a way of un
masking exploitation, misrepresentation, and misapprehension ) .
1 1 0 . See supra Part I II. A.
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111
a centrally planned
care little about privacy in this situation,
so lu tion would offer the hermit no privacy. The hermit, there
fo re , would prefer the contractual solution because it would al
112
l ow her to choose to buy her privacy if she wishes .

C.

Advantages of a Contractual Approach

In the hands of bureaucrats or judges, flexibility produces un
rtain
ty for private parties. In the hands of the contracting par
ce
ti es, however, flexibility allows people to control their lives and
efficiently tailor the law to meet their needs. Flexibility is the
market's forte; the p ricing mechanism is extremely sensitive to
variations in valuation and quickly adj usts to them .
This flexibility would produce contractual changes even
though consumers would have only two choices. Imagine a hypo
thetical: Congress has set the default rule for mail-order vendors
at no p rivacy. The Book-of-the-Month Club has ten customers, C1
through C 1 0 , most of whom loathe telephone solicitations b ut do
not care as much about junk mail. Table I displays a possible set
of merchant valuations of telephone numbers and addresses and
consumer valuations of privacy for the two types of informati o n.

l l l . The scenario i n this paragraph postulated (in the first sentence) that the m<Uority
cared little about privacy in this situation. The reasoning in the text holds true for any
situation in which fewer than half of all people care about p rivacy. The contractual solu
tion, unlike a centralized one, respects both maj ority and minority preferences.

1 1 2 . In contrast, a blanket solution would impose privacy on everyone for the sake of

the hermit. Thus all consumers, regardless of whether or not they valued privacy highly,
would have to pay a premium that reflected the costs imposed by the deceivers. This
specter also raises the danger of faction: A well-organized minority could sate its p rivacy
preferences by imposing privacy on everyone. This minority would spread p rivacy costs to
the privacy-apathetic rn<Uority even though the latter would be unwilling to pay that m u c h
for privacy. It is fairer t o im pose any social costs o n those most desiring privacy instead of
inflicting them on everyone without regard to individual preferences.
By making individuals bear the costs of privacy, moreover, the contractual solution
would make each person reflect on how much he valued privacy. This argument does not
rest on the overriding importance of the social benefits of data flow. It resl� on requiring
individuals to weigh serious tradeoffs instead of im posing their own preferences upon
others \vi th different valuations. The market would impose no undue penalty; its pricing
would reflect the value of information, and individuals would be free to choose for them
selves whether privacy is worth the costs.
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HYPOTHETICAL VALUATIONS OF INFORMATION

Book-of-the-Month Club and Its Customers
Value to:

Merchant C1 and C2

C3, C1, C5, C6,
C7, and Cs

C9 and C 10

T)'pe of Information:
Telephone Number

$2

$2

$6

$11

Address

$7

$2

$4

$8

Total Value

$9

$4

$10

$19

I f the Book Club offers the choices:

1 ) no privacy plus five dollars, or
2 ) complete privacy,
eight of the ten consumers will con tract for p rivacy because the
p rivacy is worth more than five dollars to them. The Book Club
will pay each of the remaining two consumers five dollars for
their addresses and telephone numbers, sell these data for nine
dollars per person, and make an eight dollar profit. The Book
Club, however, can make more money if it unilaterally promises
not to disclose anyone 's telephone number. If it offers the
options:

1 ) telephone-number privacy plus five dollars, or
2 ) complete privacy,
then only two privacy lovers will contract for complete privacy.
The other eight consumers will choose not to opt out. The Book
Club , therefore, will pay each of these eight consumers five dol
lars, sell their addresses for seven dollars, and make a sixteen dol
lar profit. The Book Club will prefer the latter scenario and will
promise not to release telephone numbers . The th reat of opting
out by members on the margin will lead the Book Club to tailor
its default disclosure terms to average consumer valuations. 1 1 3
Similarly, the desire to keep consumers o n the margin from o p t
ing out will lead i nformation holders to offer inducements to all
consumers. If preferences and values change , moreover, the
price mechanism will lead parties to reallocate information
1 1 3. Not only would t h i s system better reflect average p references, b u t i t would also
provide a way out for those on the privacy-preferring end of the spectrum.
The Book Club could, in theory, achieve the same resul t by o ffering consumers an
o p ti o n for telephone-number privacy as well as a total-privacy opti o n But the additional
costs of drafting and handling n ew forms would probably m ake this o p tion impractical.
.
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rights. No centralized solution can match the flexibility and dy
namism of this contractual approach .
C oNCLUSION

We value the "right ' to be let alone. "' 1 1 4 We also value the
righ t to reap the benefits of an information economy. One-size
fits-all proposals ignore the individual valuations and tradeoffs
involved. They give privacy lovers too little privacy and those in
different to privacy too much privacy. 1 1 5
By enabling people to contract for their optimal mix of privacy
and financial benefits, government could leave it to the market
to price privacy efficiently. The market would allocate informa
tion to its most-valued uses instead of forcing privacy into a Pro
crustean bed. The answer to Consumer Reports' rhetorical
question, "What Price Privacy? , " 1 1 6 should be: whatever price the
marke t will bear.

1 1 4 . Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 1 93 ,
1 9 5 ( 1 890) ( quoting THmiAS CooLEY, LAw or ToRTS 29 (Chicago, Callaghan & C o . 2d e d .
,

1 888) ) .

1 1 5 . See supra Part III.
1 1 6. Wlwt Price Privacy ?, suf>ra note 7 .

